

CPYRGHT

An article titled as above and authored by S. Slavin and N. Fedorov appeared in Rovesnik (Moscow), No 4, April 1966. An accompanying photograph carried no caption but showed rifles, guns, razors, pipes, and other objects, presumably used in intelligence work.

A complete translation of the article follows.

A young man becomes acquainted with a foreign tourist and begins to beg small things from him: a fountain pen, a cigarette lighter, a record. As gratitude for the gifts he praises America, its films, automobiles and night clubs. At the same time he complains about the dullness of Soviet life. Upon parting, he leaves his address or telephone number with the foreign guest.

Several months pass, sometimes a year. The young man has almost forgotten about his passing acquaintance. Then the telephone in his apartment rings. A voice with a slight foreign accent says: "Hello, I heard from ... (the name of the foreign tourist is given). He told me much about you and asked me to pass on some gifts".

In expectation of a pleasant surprise the young man hurries to meet the new acquaintance. His expectations are not in vain -- the foreigner really gives him new records and pretty gew-gaws, just as the first Europeans brought the Papuans colored bits of glass and beads. The foreigner does not ask the young man much: just to tell him of the morale of his comrades, and to pass on various rumors and anecdotes.

After several other meetings, the foreigner becomes bolder. He gives to understand that political information alone is insufficient, that he needs information (even heard by chance in a conversation with talkative acquaintances) on the location of military objects.

At this stage the young man may rebel. Well, he had willingly told the foreign acquaintances spiteful anecdotes, but not the location of military objects. He is not a spy and doesn't plan to become one.

Then the foreigner lets the young man hear his own anti-Soviet statements recorded on tape. Try to refute them! The usual blackmail begins.

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The young man may understand how far his thoughtless talk has taken him and tell everything to officials of the organs of state security. But he may also be afraid, give in to the blackmail and become an agent of foreign intelligence.

In this case he would receive different instructions entirely. He will be asked above all not to express his anti-Soviet views any further, so as not to draw attention to himself. Personal meetings with foreigners will also stop -- it is much better to exchange information through a secret drop.

This is an outline of some of the techniques and methods by which intelligence agencies of the imperialist states attempt to recruit into their ranks the renegades from among our youth. As with any outline, it does not reflect all the individual peculiarities and variations possible in each separate case. But the majority of elements of this outline repeat themselves in a great many of the cases with which we have had to deal. Thus the recruitment of the agent is usually done not by one, but by two or three intelligence agents in stages. Everything begins with harmless gifts and just as harmless requests. Blackmail and the threat of exposure to the Soviet authorities are also characteristic of the work of the recruiters.

Unfortunately the dirty work of recruitment is quite frequently taken on by American tourists or, more precisely, by professional intelligence personnel who come to us under the cloak of tourists.

We are far from seeing a spy in each British or American tourist. Many of them come here with the genuine desire to better understand our country. But we cannot close our eyes to the fact that the CIA makes use of all channels, to include diplomatic, scientific and cultural exchanges, to dispatch its agents.

Fairly recently the American Irving Shaw was expelled from the Soviet Union. He passed himself off as a professor and a specialist in the Russian language and literature. In reality the professor turned out to be a professional intelligence agent and recruiter. Shaw several times attempted (without success) to recruit immature young people for work for American intelligence. The "scholar of literature" was caught in the act of photographing a military object in Leningrad.

Of course not all recruiters work as crudely as Shaw. Sometimes a person might not even suspect that foreign intelligence is using him for its purposes. Such was the case, for example, with P., the principal of one of the schools of a Siberian city. At an international chemical exposition in Moscow she became acquainted with a guide named Belovench. At the request of Belovench, P. told her in detail about her home and upon parting left her address. Correspondence began, which at first was of an innocent nature. But then P. received from Belovench a letter

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with an unusual request -- to send her samples of Siberian moss and cedar needles. Belovench explained her request as being love for exotic Siberian life. It turned out later that she had asked the same thing of several other of her Soviet acquaintances living in areas of Siberia. The request which at first glance appeared innocent bore a double intelligence nature: through laboratory analysis of the soil, Siberian moss, and needles it is possible to obtain data on the location of enterprises of the atomic industry.

Each year an ever greater number of Soviet persons visits capitalist countries.

Violating all laws and rules of hospitality, foreign intelligence makes attempts to recruit Soviet people arriving in the West in the capacity of tourists or on official duty. It goes without saying that people who through their work have a relationship with industrial or military secrets present special interest to intelligence personnel.

The well-known theoretician and practitioner of intelligence and former Director of CIA, Allen Dulles writes: "If our intelligence service cannot send its own agent to a heavily guarded object, there is nothing other to do but recruit a person who is already there".

What kind of people are necessary to intelligence? Recruiters usually thoroughly study a person before approaching him with a proposal for collaboration. If they see that the "candidate" likes to drink at someone else's expense, that he is cynical in his statements, is spiritually desolate, and worships the West and its "freedoms", then their interest in him grows. Here the recruiters spare no efforts and means in striving to test all ways of cultivating the person.

This happened, for example, with Vitality Borisov, an assistant at one of the Moscow scientific research institutes.

Being on official detached duty in Austria, Borisov conducted himself extremely thoughtlessly. He drank much, spent a portion of his official funds and spent his evenings in expensive restaurants. Soon he came under the eyes of American intelligence recruiters.

The acquaintance became so intimate that Borisov permitted his generous friends to pay his bills. Finally on one fine day the "friends" showed him a photograph which had been taken of him in a separate room of the restaurant in the company of shady women. The tone of the "friends" became frankly cynical and insolent:

"You are entirely in our power. We can even send you off forcibly to West Germany or to the US and inform the press that you voluntarily came over to the West and betrayed your country. But for now we need you in the Soviet Union. After a year of working for us you will be free and can remain in the USSR or we will arrange your passage to the West. Everything will depend on you".

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Borisov was frightened, succumbed to blackmail and agreed upon his return to the USSR to pass on information about the work of his institute. Thanks only to the alertness of the organs of state security, the "activity" of Borisov was soon at an end.

Of course Borisov and those like him are only renegades and monsters in the family of Soviet people. It is much more often that the foreign "soul hunters", having come up against the alertness of the Soviet person, receive a suitable rebuff and go away disappointed.

This explains the failure of the attempt by Greek police together with intelligence of imperialist states to recruit the Soviet student Malikov, who came to Greece in the company of a tourist group.

Malikov, who got lost in the unfamiliar city while browsing through the shops of Athens, asked a policeman for information. The policeman took him to the police station. After a long rigamarole they informed the Soviet student that his passport was allegedly not in order.

Making use of the fact that Malikov did not understand Greek, the police officials proposed that he write a dictated statement, which allegedly expressed a request to make corrections in the passport. Malikov agreed. In reality however, this statement contained a request for giving Malikov political asylum in Greece.

Two days later they took him to a suburban villa, where professional intelligence agents who knew Russian now began to cultivate Malikov in an anti-Soviet manner. They praised life in the "free world" and at the same time frightened Malikov by saying that his statement was already known in the Soviet Embassy and therefore all routes for his return to the USSR were cut off.

The Soviet student understood that they had disoriented him. He refused all proposals by the intelligence men and demanded a meeting with representatives of the Soviet Embassy.

As is evident, foreign intelligence is not squeamish in using dirty methods for carrying out its aims. It makes the most cynical provocations in order to compromise Soviet people abroad and thus create soil for subsequent blackmail.

A large sum of counterfeit currency was handed to Soviet artists in London during rehearsal in the Albert Hall theater. And in England one of the members of the Soviet soccer team found in his desk drawer a check for a large sum of money. In both cases the "soul hunters" believed that someone would "bite" on the money and it would be possible to raise a cry of thievery, introduction of counterfeit currency, etc. Blackmail is usually followed by proposals to collaborate with intelligence. Thanks to the alertness of the Soviet people all these provocations have failed miserably.

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Our contacts with capitalist countries are broadening and will broaden in the future. For this reason, the ideological hardening of our youth and the instilling in them of vigilance and Soviet patriotism become increasingly important.

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